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I. INTERNATIONAL NORMS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE
The export of hazardous wastes to developing countries gar-
nered world attention in 1988 when, after a series of well pub-
licized "garbage barges" laden with wastes sailed around the
world seeking disposal sites, the barges were rebuffed by both
developing and industrial countries alike.' In one of the most
widely discussed cases, 3,800 tons of toxic wastes were dumped
in a dirt lot in Koko, Nigeria between August 1987 and May
1988, in a deal arranged by an Italian waste trader. When
authorities discovered the wastes in June 1988 after receiving
reports of local residents falling ill, the Nigerian government
ordered Italy to retrieve the wastes. A West German freighter,
the Karin B, picked up part of the waste in late July and
attempted to find Western European countries that would accept
* Staff editor, HARVARD ENviRONMENTAL LAW REVIEw; J.D., Harvard Law School,
Class of 1994; B.A., Yale University, 1991. The author wishes to thank Andrew R.
Willard at the Yale Law School for his helpful comments and assistance.
See Dirty Job, Sweet Profits, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 21, 1988, at 54-
56; Jean-Paul Dufour & Corinne Denis, The North's Garbage Goes South, WORLD PRESS
REV., Nov. 1988, at 30-31; Exporting Hazardous Waste, TECH. REV., April 6, 1989, at
6-7; The Global Poison Trade, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 7, 1988, at 66-68.
For a detailed overview of the international trade in hazardous waste, see CENTER
FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING & B. MOYERS, GLOBAL DUMPING GROUND: THE INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE IN HAZARDOUS WASTE (1990) [hereinafter GLOBAL DUMPING GROUND];
GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL WASTE TRADE PROJECT, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN
WASTES: A GREENPEACE INVENTORY (J. Vallete & H. Spaulding, eds., 5th ed. 1990)
[hereinafter GREENPEACE INVENTORY].
Although this paper refers to the "export" of hazardous wastes, strictly speaking,
industrialized countries do not sell their wastes to developing countries. Rather, in most
waste trade deals, a representative of a developing country will sell the service of disposal
to the firm or city seeking disposal of its wastes (through waste trade brokers).
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the waste. Nine weeks and six country refusals later, it returned
to the Italian port of Livorno to face hostile dockworkers who
refused to unload the waste for more than two months. In mid-
1990 the Karin B wastes were repackaged and sent to the U.K.
for incineration. Another vessel, the Deepsea Carrier, loaded the
rest of the waste from Koko in August 1988, and faced similar
series of national rejections. After a year of bobbing outside
ports, waiting for permission to dock, the vessel finally unloaded
the waste in Livorno.2
The international reaction that followed incident reaffirmed
and clarified at least three international norms regarding the
international trade in hazardous wastes. First, where it was once
a largely unregulated business conducted between private traders,
exporting states are now considered the main agents of respon-
sibility for the transfer and disposal of toxic wastes. Second, the
trade in hazardous wastes requires public sector regulation, con-
sisting of the duty of prior notification by the exporting state
and the duty to obtain prior consent from the importing state
and states of transit. Third, the authority of a state to control
its natural resources now includes the sovereign right to ban the
import of hazardous substances. A close examination of the
"Koko incident" and the international appraisal that followed
illustrates the development of these international norms.
II. DEFINING HAZARDOUS WASTE
Every country defines hazardous waste differently. The def-
inition provided by the March 1989 U.N. Environment Pro-
gramme ("UNEP") Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Dis-
posal reflects the standard definition.3 The Convention identifies
I See GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 1, at 336-37; Crew Fall Sick on Toxic
Waste Ship, TIE TIMES (LONDON), Sept. 3, 1988, at 1; Dirty Job, Sweet Profits,
supra note 1, at 155; End of Karin B's Odyssey Finds Italian Port Up In Arms, THE
TIMES (LONDoN), Sept. 20, 1988, at 9 [hereinafter Up in Arms]; Waste Dumpers Turning
to West Africa, N.Y. TIMEs, July 17, 1988, 1, at 1, col. 2 [hereinafter Waste Dumpers];
West Africa in Toxic Waste Dumping Furor, FACTS ON FILE, Aug. 12, 1988, at 584-85
[hereinafter Waste Dumping Furor].
I Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Waste and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, __ U.S.T. -, .U.N.T.S. __ ,
reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989) [hereinafter Basel Convention].
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eighteen categories of waste streams from industrial production,
4
twenty-seven hazardous chemicals,, and fourteen characteristics
that must be present (e.g., inflammability, corrosiveness, and
toxicity) in order for a substance to be "hazardous waste." 6 The
Convention excludes household wastes or residues arising from
the incineration of household wastes, 7 or radioactive materials8
from its definition.9
1II. THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT OF PREVIOUS INCIDENTS
The first reported incidents of toxic waste exports occurred
in the United States, after the U.S. government enacted the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act in 1978, which made
domestic regulations for the proper disposal of hazardous wastes
more stringent and expensive, providing the incentive for waste
traders to seek cheaper and unrestricted markets abroad.' 0 In
October 1979, the State Department learned that a Colorado
firm had offered President Shiaka Stevens of Sierra Leone "up
to $25 million" for permission to dispose of hazardous waste in
4 Basel Convention, Annex I (listing "Categories of Wastes to Be Controlled,"
which include, for example: "Clinial wastes from medical care in hospitals, medical
centers and clinics;" "Wastes from the production, formulation and use of biocides and
phytopharmaceuticals;" "Waste substances and articles containing or contaminated with
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) and/or polychlorinated terphenyls (PCTs) and/or po-
lybrominated biphenyls (PBBs);" "Wastes from production, formulation and use of
inks, dyes, pigments, paints, lacquers, varnish;" "Residues arising from industrial waste
disposal operations").
5 Id.
6 Id., Annex fit. In the United States, the term "hazardous waste" is defined in
the Comprehensive Enviromental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
9601(14) (1988).
See Basel Convention, Annex II (listing "Categories of Wastes Requiring Special
Consideration"); Art. 1(2) ("Wastes that belong to any category contained in Annex II
that are subject to transboundary movement shall be "other wastes" for the purposes
of this Convention").
I Id. Increasingly, nations are including radioactive wastes in their legislation
dealing with the trade of hazardous wastes, which have been traditionally regulated
under separate protocols.
9 One commentator has pointed out that existing waste definitions are deficient
because they do not facilitate the monitoring of international waste management and
suggests that a description of wastes accompanied by an analysis of the best available
technology for its treatment would better regulate the movement of wastes. Eli Louka,
The Transnational Management of Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes, OCCASIONAL
PAPER No. I (Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights, Yale Law
School, 1992), at 21.
'o PILLS, PESTICIDES AND PROFMrS: THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN TOXIC SUBSTANCES,
(Ruth Norris, ed., 1982) at 71 [hereinafter PnLs, PESTICIDas AND PROFITS]. "
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that country."I Under pressure from its citizens and neighboring
countries Nigeria and Ghana, as well the U.S. State Department
and Sierra Leonean students in the United States, Stevens an-
nounced in February 1980 the plan was "fool-hardy" and re-
jected it outright.'2 Other early waste trade deals, once made
public, also elicited rejection.
13
By the late 1970s, governments publicly denounced the trade
in toxic wastes in various international forums. At a May 1977
meeting of the UNEP, Dr. J. C. Kiano, a Kenyan minister,
called for international regulations and warned that Third World
countries would no longer tolerate being "dumping grounds for
products that have not been adequately tested.' 1 4 Recognizing
the international scope of this issue, the Governing Council of
UNEP addressed the issue for the first time in 1979, when it
called upon member states "to exchange information on hazard-
ous chemicals and unsafe pharmaceutical products that have
been banned in their territories and to discourage, in consultation
with importing countries, the exportation of such products to
other countries."'" In 1980 and 1981, the UNEP adopted several
resolutions that requested exporting nations to recognize their
obligations to provide their trading partners the opportunity for
informed consent. All of these recommendations were strictly
voluntary, however.
Western European countries and Japan also exported haz-
ardous wastes in the 1970s. In 1984, the European Commission
(EC) issued a directive that required exporting countries to notify
recipient countries of intended waste shipments.' 7 A 1986 EC
directive required that exporters ensure that a written agreement
1 GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 1, at 101.
12 Id.
'1 In 1980, for example, Haiti and Antigua both turned down a proposal for
building a disposal facility for sewage sludge from Washington, DC, and in March 1981,
Mexican authorities arrested a U.S. citizen, Clarence Niguent, charging him with illegally
importing hazardous wastes, which included the highly toxic polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs), from companies in Texas and Kentucky. PILLS, PESTICIDES AND PROFITS, supra
note 10, at 73.
" Id., at 88.
51 Id., at 89-90. As early as 1957, the United Nations has issued Recommendations
of the U.N. Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous goods, updated
biennially, but this was the first reference to the trade in toxic wastes. Id.
Id., at 90.
, Directive on the Supervision and Control Within the European Community of
the Transfrontier Shipment of Hazardous Waste, (84/631/EC), 27 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L. 326) 31 (1984).
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with the importing country exists and that the recipients have
the technological capability to handle the wastes in environmen-
tally safe ways. 8 Until the Koko incident in 1988, only three
countries, Denmark, Greece and Belgium, had made the directive
part of national law. 9 In 1987, UNEP met and issued the Cairo
Guidelines and Principles for the Environmentally Sound Man-
agement of Hazardous wastes, 20 which promotes the transfer of
environmental protection technology.
21
Despite these early initiatives at regulating the international
transfer of toxic wastes, by 1987 exports of toxic wastes soared.
Officially recorded exports in the United States increased by
approximately sixteen times since 1980, according to the U. S.
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), and that figure did
not include wastes such as incinerator ash (not classified as
hazardous) or the many deals that go unrecorded. In both Eu-
rope and the United States, disposal costs climbed to around
$2,500 a ton, which caused industrialized countries to turn in-
creasingly to developing nations, where disposal methods aver-
aged $20 a ton and cost as little as $3 a ton.22 In 1989, Western
Europe produced approximately 30 to 40 million tons of waste
a year and exported approximately 2.5 million tons, of which
125,000 goes to the Third World, according to Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) figures. 23 Ac-
cording to EPA, the United States produces approximately 275
million tons of hazardous waste a year, 24 and exports approxi-
mately 2.2 million tons, most of which go to Mexico or Can-
ada.
25
11 Amending Directive 84/631 EEC on the Supervision and Control within Euro-
pean Community of the Transfrontier Shipment of Hazardous Waste, (86/279/EC), 29
O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L. 181) 13 (1986).
,9 Steven Greenhouse, Europe's Failing Effort to Exile Toxic Trash, N.Y. TniES,
Oct. 16, 1988, 4at 6 [hereinafter Europe's Failing Effort].
I Cairo Guidelines and Principles for the Environmentally Sound Management of
Hazardous Wastes, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.14/17, Annex 11 (1987)
1, Id. See also Basel Convention, preamble ("Recognizing the need to promote the
transfer of technology for the sound management of hazardous wastes and other waste
produced locally, particularly to the developing countries in accordance with the spirit
of the Cairo Guidelines and decision 14/16 of the Governing Council of UNEP").
z Waste Dumpers, supra note 2.
" Steven Greenhouse, U.N. Conference Supports Curbs on Exporting of Hazard-
ous Waste, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1989 [hereinafter U.N. Conference Supports], at Al,
col. 1.
2 GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 1, at 286.
2 Dirty job, sweet profits, supra note 1, at 54.
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The shady character of exporting waste arises in almost all
transactions. Often poorly monitored, waste traders set up phony
export-import companies, create vague documents, and con-
stantly switch destinations and ship names. For small-size deals,
a waste trader will often send the toxic waste to a false address,
to a port where the cargo sits until someone notices the smell
or people get ill, by which time a few months have usually gone
by and the original shipper is impossible to trace. For middle-
size deals, a waste trader pays a poor person with a large, empty
plot of land to store the wastes (as in the Koko incident), and
for a "big deal," the trader deals directly with a poor govern-
ment, wielding contracts that often promise a disposal that will
follow international standards that are "100% ecological."
26
The financial incentive to participate in this global market is
enormous for all parties. For the exporting nations, disposal
costs average six times less than at home. Waste traders, ac-
cording to a Belgian environmentalist, "earn fabulous profits
without the risk of drug smuggling or running guns. ' 27 In an
ad placed in the May 25, 1988 issue of The International Herald
Tribune, this message was clearly underscored:
Thinking about making money? Hazardous toxic waste a bil-
lion-dollar-a-year business. No experience necessary. No equip-
ment needed. No educational requirements.
28
The OECD estimated that :in 1987 waste disposal was a $20-
billion-a-year business. In just the one Koko incident, Italian
businessman Gianfranco Raffaelli stood to gain $4.3 million in
profits. Developing countries also face financial incentives to
take the wastes, as the prospect of hundreds of millions of
dollars for merely storing hazardous wastes will often outweigh
anticipated environmental or health damages to the nation.2 9 In
almost all cases, the developing countries do not possess ade-
quate facilities or administrative structures to properly dispose
of the wastes.3 0
z' Jean-Paul Dufour, supra note 1, at 31; U.N. Conference Supports, supra note
23, at BII, col. 1 .
' The Global Poison Trade, supra note 1, at 67.
Jean-Paul Dufour, supra note 1, at 32; GLOBAL DUMPINGt GROUND, supra note
I, at 4.
1 Dirty Job, Sweet Profits, supra note i, at 55.
10 See Burton Bollag, Hazardous Waste is a Foreign Matter, CsEMscAL WEEK,
Dec. 7, 1988, at 45 (describing that "[v]irtually all hazardous waste sent to developing
countries goes into landfills").
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Despite these incredible financial pressures, developing coun-
tries have increasingly rejected toxic wastes, and have even ac-
cused the industrialized nations of practicing a new form of
imperialism, that of spreading "toxic terror."'" In the immediate
years preceding the Koko incident, four incidents occurred in
which the growing international norms emerged: governments
proclaimed their right to refuse imports of toxic wastes, and
some went as far as taking punitive actions against their own
and other country's citizens. The governments that rejected the
wastes primarily asserted that prior notification and informed
consent were required before the import of the wastes would be
permitted. Because the vessels carrying the wastes had no set
destinations once their original disposal sites rejected their car-
gos, country after country denied the ships ingress.
The first highly publicized waste trading vessel was New
York's "garbage barge," the Mobro, which travelled for five
months and 6,000 miles along the coast of the United States and
around the Caribbean, carrying 3,186 tons of solid waste from
Long Island.32 On March 22, 1987, the vessel left Islip, New
York, and six U.S. states, North Carolina, Alabama, Florida,
Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas rejected the cargo. In the fol-
lowing months, the ship confronted still more refusals: the Mex-
ican government banned the vessel after a deal was nearly
completed; the Beize government placed its defense forces on
alert for the vessel; and the Bahamas police put out an alert for
the vessel after a land developer attempted to unload the garbage
on a nearby, uninhabited island, Little San Salvador A3 On Sep-
tember 1, the barge returned to New York City, where the
garbage was unloaded and incinerated14 The responses of the
U.S. states point to a "not in my backyard" reaction that many
citizens in industrialized countries adopt. The responses of the
three Caribbean countries reinforced the growing suspicion and
hostility toward foreign ships bearing industrial wastes.
A more dramatic case, one that illustrates the truly global
nature of the trade, involved the around-the-world voyage of
three ships carrying 2,200 tons of toxic wastes to four continents
' Jean-Paul Dufour, supra note 1, at 584.
32 GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 1, at 294.
Id., at 295.
" Id., at 1ll; Steven Greenhouse, Toxic Waste Boomerang: Ciao Italy!, N.Y.
TiMEs, Sept. 3, 1988, 1, at 4, col I [hereinafter Toxic Waste Boomerang].
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during a 14-month period.35 The wastes, which included resins,
pesticides and PCBs, were collected by an Italian waste trade
broker named Jelly Wax, one of the same firms that handled
the Koko wastes.16 In February 1987, a Maltese vessel, the Lynx,
loaded the wastes and set sail to Djibouti where the authorities
prevented the unloading of the wastes.3 7 The vessel then sailed
to Venezuela, where it unloaded the wastes in Puerto Cabello in
April. The waste was left above ground for six months until
reports of dockworkers becoming sick, fires breaking out, drums
leaking, and children dying from exposure prompted the Vene-
zuelan government to order the wastes to be removed.3" In
November 1987, the Makiri removed the wastes and a month
later dumped them in Tartous, Syria, where Jelly Wax had paid
a Syrian company $200,000 to accept the wastes.3 9 In February
of the following year, the Syrian government ordered the re-
moval of the wastes, and a Syrian ship Zanoobia carried the
waste back to Italy, after attempting but failing to unload the
waste in Greece. The ship arrived in Marina di Carrara-the
same port from which the wastes originated-but permission to
unload was denied, because the vessel did not carry the necessary
permits. In late May, the Italian government agreed to take the
wastes at the port city Genoa, but dockworkers went on strike
rather than unload the wastes. ° Half of the wastes eventually
was unloaded in Italy late 1988, and the rest was sent to disposal
sites in England and France. Later, two British waste companies
inexplicably backed out of their contracts, leaving the fate of
those wastes in the air.4 ' The Syrian sailors, meanwhile, suffered
skin diseases, breathing problems, and were constantly dizzy
throughout their trip; nine crew members were hospitalized; and
one had died en route, possibly from contact with the wastes.
4 2
The whole sequence of events accorded "leper" status to the
ships, with every government they encountered overriding its
private corporations that arranged any waste deals.
3' GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 1, at 332.
Id., at 334.
I d., at 332.
3I Id.
- Id., at 333.
- Id.
4 Id., at 334.
11 Outcast Ship Finds No Port in a Poison Storm, THE TIMES (LONDON), May 27,
1988, at 2; Third World Awakes to Toxic Trade Perils, TiE T m s (LONDoN), June 17,
1988, at 12.
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The third case involved the journey of the highly publicized
ship, the Khian Sea. In August 1986, a Bahamas-owned cargo
ship, Khian Sea, set out from Philadelphia loaded with more
than 14,000 tons of toxic incinerator ash,43 attempting to dump
its cargo in the Bahamas after failing to find a U.S. state to
accept the waste." The Bahamas refused to import the ash, and
the Khian Sea began a twenty-seven month saga of travelling
around the world, and was rejected by at least fifteen countries
on five continents. 4 The Bahamas, Bermuda, Cape Verde Is-
lands, Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras, and the Dominican Repub-
lic rejected the wastes, and in December 1987, the ship dumped
the ashes in Haiti, which had issued an import permit for "fer-
tilizer."46 After discovering the ash, Haiti ordered the ship to
reload in January 1988, but an estimated 2,000 to 4,500 tons of
the ash were left behind on a beach.4 7 In March 1988 the Khian
Sea returned to Philadelphia, but did not receive permission to
unload the remaining ash; in June, the vessel crossed the Atlantic
Ocean." After facing further rejections from Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau and Senegal, the ship arrived in Yugoslavia in early July,
where the vessel was renamed the Felicia.4 9 In the fall, the boat
planned to land in Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Indonesia and
,1 The United States does not classify incinerator ash as toxic waste, even though
it often contains toxic dioxins and other toxic chemicals, and is classified as hazardous
waste in the Basel Convention. Basel Convention, Annex I ("Residues arising from
industrial waste disposal operations.") An EPA report indicated that the ash aboard the
Khian Sea contained high levels of lead and cadmium and significant traces of dioxins.
Global Dumping Ground, supra note 1, at 20, and is classified as hazardous waste under
the Basel Convention.
- GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 1, at 21.
45 Id., at 21, 23.
"4 Id., at 21.
' Id. Four years later, the ash still remains on the beach. In an effort to clean
the shores, two Haitian environmental groups sent 500 envelopes containing the toxic
incinerator ash to the Mayor of Philadelphia, Wilson Goode, and to the administrator
of EPA, William Reilly in 1991. EPA's position was that the cleanup was now Haiti's
responsibility. Philadelphia and U.S. EPA get Unexpected Ash Packets, GREENPEACE
WASTE TRADE UPDATE, Mar. 22, 1991, at 15. In July 1992, the U.S. Justice Department
indicted two men who shipped the ash, on grounds that they lied to a Grand Jury.
Indictments Announced in Philadelphia's Haiti Ash Scandal, GREENPEACE ToXic TRADE
UPDATE 5.2 (1992), at 9.
,1 10,000 Tons of Toxic Ash Disappear in the Indian Ocean, GREENPEACE WASTE
TRADE UPDATE , Jan. 15, 1989, at i.
" GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 1, at 23; Dirty Job, Sweet Profits, supra
note 1, at 67 (map). The owners of the Khian Sea claimed they had sold the bessel to
a firm named Romo Shipping that was incorporated in the Caribbean island of Nevis.
GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 1, at 23.
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Singapore, but each of these governments also denied entry to
the boat. 0 In November, the vessel showed up off the coast of
Singapore with its hold empty, and under a new name, the
Pelicano, prompting suspicions that the cargo was dumped some-
where in the Indian Ocean.5
The last incident resulted in the arrest of a European diplo-
matic officer. In March 1988, a Norwegian shipping company,
Bulkhandling, dumped 15,000 tons of Philadelphia incinerator
ash in an abandoned quarry in Kassa, a resort island of Guinea.1
2
The substance was listed as "raw material for bricks," but the
few bricks that were made from it were unusable. When the
government discovered in July that the local vegetation had
started to shrivel, and that the waste was the first installment of
a contract to dispose of 85,000 tons of chemical wastes, it
ordered the removal of the waste. The government response was
exceptionally harsh, as evidenced by General Lansana Conte's
statement, "[w]e will make them regret their actions so that
society will know that they are at fault. This will discourage
others from doing the same thing."53 The government announced
that four government officials, two from the trade ministry,
were sentenced to four years of imprisonment each. The govern-
ment also arrested Norway's honorary consul, Sigmund Stromme,
as the administrator of the company involved in the waste trans-
fer, Guinomar. Stromme was released on the basis of diplomatic
immunity, fined $600, and placed on a six-month suspended
sentence. 14 In June of that year, a Norwegian cargo ship re-
moved the waste."
These incidents occurred concurrently with the Koko inci-
dent. International reactions in 1988 and 1989 and the growing
international norms were responses to the proliferation of the
waste trade in general, rather than specifically to this incident.
However, the Koko-incident illustrates particularly well the emer-
gence of these norms-the Nigerian state held Nigerian and
10,000 Tons of Toxic Ash Disappear in the Indian Ocean, supra note 48, at 1.
I ld.; Dirty Job, Sweet Profits, supra note 1, at 56; The Global Trade in Poisons,
supra note 1, at 68.
" GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 1, at 79.
I d., at 80.
54 Waste Dumpers, supra note 2, at Al; Conakry Domestic Service in
French, Officials Arrested in Toxic Waste Case, F.B.I.S.-A.F.R., June 16, 1988, at 18.
" Paris Associated Foreign Press, Norwegian Ship Arrives to Remove Toxic Waste,
F.B.I.S.-A.F.R., June 23, 1988, at 20.
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Italian individuals accountable; the exporting country took re-
sponsibility for retrieving the wastes; industrial countries rejected
the waste as well; and the international reaction that resulted
(which is not entirely separable from the reaction to the other
cases) represented the emerging international consensus on the
issue.
IV. THE FACTS OF THE KOKO INCIDENT
Between August 1987 and May 1988, five ships transported
3,800 tons of hazardous wastes, collected from various European
countries and the United States, to Koko in the then Bendel
State, now Delta State, Nigeria, under an agreement in which
Italian waste trader Gianfranco Rafaelli persuaded a retired lum-
ber worker, Sunday Nana, to store the wastes in a dirt lot near
his home for $100 a month.5 6 Nigerian authorities did not learn
of the scheme until June 2, 1988, after some Nigerian students
in Italy sent copies of the articles to their home country. The
next day, Gianfranco Rafaelli skipped town.
7
On June 7, 1988, the External Affairs Minister, General Ike
Nwachukwu, asked the United Nations to intervene and to send
a clear message to transnational corporations to stop dumping
wastes in Africa.5" On June 9, Nigerian authorities seized a
Danish cargo ship, the Danix, suspected of having helped ship
the waste to Koko and an unrelated Italian ship, the Piave, in
Lagos harbor to press Italy to act. 59 The same day, Nigerian
President Ibrahim Babangida recalled the Nigerian ambassador
from Italy for "immediate consultations," a move which fell
short of severing diplomatic relations, and asked the Italian
government to recall its charge d'affaires in Lagos.60 The follow-
ing day, the Italian Foreign Ministry denied that the Nigerian
government had asked for the recall of its envoy.6' Nigeria's
ambassador returned to Italy at the end of August after Italy
3 GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 1, at 90; Jean-Paul Dufour, supra note 1,
at 583.
" Waste Dumpers, supra note 2, at Al.
38 Toxic Waste Importers Face Execution, WEST AFRICA, June 20, 1988, at 1133.
" London BBC World Service in English, Authorities Seize Danish Vessel in Toxin
Case, F.B.I.S.-A.F.R., June 17, 1988, at 23.
Toxic Waste Importer Face Execution, supra note 58, at 1133.
" Rome ANSA in English, Ministry Denies Nigeria Asks Envoy's Recall, F.B.I.S.-
A.F.R., June 14, 1988, at 4.
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helped removed the wastes. 62 Nigeria also considered legal action
against Italy. According to the Justice Minister, Prince Bola
Ajibola, Nigeria would take the matter to the International
Court of Justice.
63
President Babangida warned that anyone found guilty of
importing radioactive waste would be shot. By June 13, the
Nigerian government had arrested fifteen people, including Raf-
faelli's Italian partner, Desiderio Perazzi, set up a special tri-
bunal to try them, and ordered Italy to retrieve the wastes. 64 On
June 13, Nigerian health officials reported three workers had
suffered from severe chemical burns while moving the wastes.
65
The Danish ship was only held briefly, while the Piave was not
released until the end of July. In the months following the
discovery, reports surfaced of premature deaths, dockworkers
becoming paralyzed or suffering severe chemical burns, and
nineteen deaths from contaminated rice.66
At the end of June, Italy agreed to remove the wastes, and
a subsidiary of an Italian government oil company chartered
two West German ships, the Karin B and the Deepsea Carrier,
to pick up the wastes. 67 More than 150 Nigerian workers were
employed to repackage the wastes. The Nigerian government
provided the mechanical equipment, protective clothing and gas
masks, and the United States, through the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, donated some gear as well. The British govern-
ment also indicated its willingness to donate cleanup gear.
68
However, many workers were hospitalized for chemical burns,
nausea, vomiting blood, and partial paralysis. 69 On June 20,
China and India announced that they would assist Nigeria by
providing workers to help clear the waste. 70 The government
Lagos International Service in English, Toxic Wastes Removed; Envoy to Italy
Returns, F.B.I.S.-A.F.R., Aug. 26, 1988, at 27.
'1 Toxic Waste Importer Face Execution, supra note 58, at 1133; Red Alert Over
Toxic Waste Ship, WEST AFRICA, Sept. 5-11, 1988, at 1643.
& Id.
6' Waste Dumpers, supra note 2 at Al, col. 2.
Dirty Job, Sweet Profits, supra note 1, at 55.
6, Loren Jenkins, After Dumping on Nigeria, Italy Takes it All Back, WAsH. POST,
Sept. 4, 1988, at A38.
" GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 1, at 95; Lagos Domestic Service in English.
U.S. Donates Toxic Waste Protective Gear, F.B.I.S.-A.F.R., July 27, 1988, at 27.
Lagos Domestic Service in English, Toxic Waste Removal Said to End in 2
Weeks: Workers Hospitalized, F.B.I.S.-A.F.R., July 18, 1988, at 25.
"0 Lagos International Service in English, Foreign Assistance in Koko, F.B.I.S.-
A.F.R., June 22, 1988, at 23.
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paid each worker a 500 naira ($107) cash bonus, and the minister
of works and housing ordered 50,000 naira (around $10,000)
worth of drugs, protective gear and medical equipment for the
workers. 7 Meanwhile, residents of Koko rejected plans to evac-
uate the town. The Nigerian Government also set up vigilante
groups at all ports and jetties in the country in order to prevent
further attempts at dumping.
72
On July 30, 1988, the Karin B picked up 2,100 tons of the
waste, and headed to Ravenna, an Italian port off the coast of
Africa. Officials in Ravenna had protested a week earlier, so the
vessel attempted to dock at Cadiz, but Spanish authorities or-
dered it to leave. 7 On August 15, the Deepsea Carrier picked
up the rest of the waste from Koko, and headed back to Italy.
By the end of August, The Netherlands, the home of one of
Europe's most advanced toxic disposal sites, also refused the
Karin B, as well as West Germany, Britain and France. In
England, on August 30, public pressure and heated debate among
the British press and parliament members over the fate of the
Karin B caused Mrs. Virginia Bottomley, the Under-Secretary
of State at the Department of the Environment, to tell the Italian
ambassador that it was Italy's problem.7 4
Italy agreed to take back the toxic waste on September 2.
7-
The Italian Cabinet approved a decree that banned waste exports
to third-world countries and ordered every region in Italy to
prepare waste treatment plans. 76 A French naval doctor was
flown to the Karin B, while it floated off the coast of Le Havre,
where the captain asked five of his ten crew to evacuate, since
they had been suffering from chest and back pains.7 7 On Sep-
tember 16, the Italian cabinet announced that the Karin B's
cargo would head to the Italian port Livorno, while the Deepsea
Carrier's load would head to Ravenna or Manfredonia. Local
protests in each of these ports blocked the unloading, and several
71 GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note I, at 95.
72 Lagos Domestic Service in English, Vigilantes to Combat Dumping, F.B.I.S.-
A.F.R., June 23, 1988, at 25.
7" Jenkins, supra note 67.
11 See Nicholas Wood & Sheila Gunn, Toxic Cargo Vessel is Banned From Entering
Britain, THE TIEs (LONDoN), Aug. 31, 1988, at 1.
75 Italy Agrees to Take Back Toxic Waste, FACTS ON FuLE, Sept. 1988, at 700.
76 At that point, experts estimated that Italy could only handle 10 to 15% of the
five million metric tons generated there annually. Toxic Waste Boomerang, supra note
34, at A4, col. 3.
7 Crew Fall Sick on Toxic Waste Ship, supra note 2, at Ic.
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people were injured in Manfredonia when police clashed with
the protesters.78 The Karin B arrived in Livorno on September
19, but the mayor of Livorno issued an entry ban upon discov-
ering that toxics were leaking from the ship.79 The prefect over-
ruled the ban; 1,400 port workers went on strike; and finally,
on December 20, twenty-five Italian workers unloaded the ship.
The wastes were transported to a temporary storage site in Emilia
Romagna, repackaged, and shipped off again for incineration.
In January 1989, the first ten containers of the repackaged
wastes left Livorno. By mid-1990, the Karin B wastes were
heading towards the U.K. for incineration. 0
Meanwhile, the Deepsea Carrier was anchored outside the
port of Augusta, waiting for permission to dock. For the first
half of 1989, the ship remained offshore and faced several
confrontations with Greenpeace. This environmental group dis-
covered that the boat contained 2,500 tons of wastes, and that
the crew had been on board the whole time with no protective
clothing or monitoring equipment. 1I The Deepsea Carrier finally
docked in Livorno harbor and unloaded the waste in August
1989. One hundred forty-nine containers of waste were stored
in Livorno, as authorities searched for a suitable company to
dispose of the waste.82
On March 3, 1990, two years after the hazardous wastes
were first discovered, Sunday Nana, the man who accepted the
wastes in his backyard, died. 3 The official news agency of
Nigeria reported that Nana's death was unrelated to the toxic
dumping, and that he had developed tuberculosis before the
waste had been dumped on his land.Y Today, the former dump
site has been turned into a research center for the study of toxic
waste.s
V. CONFLICTING CLAIMS
Relatively few conflicting claims arose in the Koko incident
about what actually happened. In particular, Nigeria claimed
" GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note I, at 335.
" Up in Arms, supra note 2, at 9.
0 Id., at 9; GR.EENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 1, at 336-37.
' GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 1, at 336.
82 Elsewhere in Europe, GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE, Dec. 1989, at 12;
GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 1, at 337.
" Obituary, GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE, Mar. 22, 1991, at 16.
'" Id.
"2 GLOBAL DuwinNr GROUND, supra note 1, at 2.
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that the wastes contained radioactive substances, which Italy
denied. Claims for remuneration did not surface as each country
took their burden seemingly willingly. As for conflicting concep-
tions of lawfulness, Italy briefly defended its citizens who ar-
ranged the trade, claiming that it was a legal agreement between
two private companies, while Nigerian called the trade a crime
against its people. Perhaps the absence of a claim should have
surfaced but did not (and not surprisingly)-the wastes were
actually collected from many industrial countries, not just Italy,
yet none of these countries rose to claim any responsibility.
With regard to the factual claim over the radioactivity of
the wastes, the Nigerian press reported that three drums con-
tained a "highly radioactive material," citing experts they invited
from the Japanese Atomic Energy Research Institute.16 The Jap-
anese report actually stated that the waste emitted low-level
radiation that was not capable of immediately harming human
lives.8 7 The United States dispatched a three-person team to
assess the dump, joined by two doctors from the Centers for
Disease Control, and by experts from the United Kingdom. None
of the experts identified radioactive wastes. The environmental
group, Friends of the Earth, took representative samples of the
waste in late June, and found the drums contained chlorinated
solvents, waste resins and some highly toxic PCBs, which com-
posed up to 28%o of the waste. Although they found these drums
to be in poor condition and leaking, they also did not mention
the presence of radioactive substances."8 Scientists from the Brit-
ish Atomic Energy Authority, who also inspected the wastes,
reported no excessive radioactivity in the area. 89 Initially, how-
ever, the belief that the wastes were radioactive wastes prompted
President Babangida to announce on June 14 that anyone found
guilty of importing radioactive waste would be executed by firing
squad.90
When the wastes were first discovered, Italy defended the
trade as a legal agreement between Sunday Nana's Iruekpen
Dakar PANA in English, Dumps Prove Poisonous, F.B.I.S.-A.F.R. June 23,
1988, at 25.
" Lagos Domestic Service in English, Japanese Experts Report, F.B.I.S.-A.F.R.,
July 18, 1988,at 26.
Peter Mulligan, Cancer-causing Agents Found in Cargo, THE TiMEs (LoNDoN),
Aug. 31, 1988, at 2; Jenkins, supra note 67, at A38.
11 London BBC Word Service in English, Waste Called "Dangerous" F.B.I.S.-
A.F.R., June 28, 1988, at 27.
- Toxic Waste Importers Face Execution, supra note 58, at 1133.
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL L.
Construction company and Gianfranco Raffaeli's Jelly Wax.9'
The wastes were imported under a permit that labelled the subst-
ances "related to the building trade," as "residual and allied
chemicals" and as "non-explosive, non-radioactive and non-self
combustible chemicals." 92 From a Nigerian account, a Nigerian
clearing agent repeatedly bypassed normal port procedures, Ra-
faelli forged incorporation papers and substituted twenty toxic
and radioactive materials. 93 By September, Italy acknowledged
its responsibility and agreed to remove the wastes, which reaf-
firmed Nigeria's claims.
VI. ITALIAN AND NIGERIAN RESPONSES: CLARIFYING
RESPECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES
The actions of the governments involved in the Koko inci-
dent-Italy and Nigeria-clarify some of the responsibilities of
parties involved in a toxic waste cleanup. Italy helped with some
of the cleanup, taking responsibility for removing and replacing
the contaminated top soil and covering the lot with asphalt;
scraping the immediate surroundings, including the port area,
and shipping the debris out of the country.Y Both Italy and
Nigeria took independent tests of the soil and surrounding plants
to monitor the contamination. Italy also covered the reshipment
costs, which the Ministry of Environment estimated at $14.3
million just for the Karin B, and $75 million for treating the
wastes once they returned to Italy. The Italian government sought
to recoup some of these costs by pressuring producers and
exporters of the waste to pay their share. For example, Minister
Ruffolo summoned thirty-seven Italian companies to meet with
him last December, and on September 20, 1988, Italian govern-
ment officials went to court to force twenty-two producers and
brokers to pay the $75 million.95
Waste Dumping Furor, supra note 2, at 585.
Id., at 94; Lagos Domestic Service in English, Government Findings Released,
F.B.1.S.-A.F.R., June 15, 1988, at 29 [hereinafter Government Findings Released].
" Government Findings Released, supra note 92, at 29.
Decontaminating Koko, WEST AFRICA, Dec. 19-25, 1988, at 2399.
Jim Vallete, THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1N WASTES: A GREENPEACE INVENTORY,
(4th ed., 1989), at 122; see also Italy: Excerpt of Law on the Transfrontier Disposal of
Industrial Waste, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 393 (1989), Art. 9(11) ("Costs borne in whateve
way by the public authority for the disposal of special waste, as well as toxic and
noxious waste, exported abroad shall be charged jointly and severally to the waste
producer and carrier...).
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Neither of the countries provided any monetary compensa-
tion for the injury to the environment or for diminished capacity
or loss of life. The Nigerian government provided the workers,
the protective gear (with help from the United States and Great
Britain) and the wages for these workers. Since the Nigerian
government did not press Italy for any monetary compensation,
only removal of the wastes, the result was a sharing of the
financial and physical burdens of the cleanup, which the Friends
of the Earth estimated to be 8 million naira, or 1 million pounds.
According to the Xinhua news service, by August 1988, the
Nigerian government had already spent over $1 million in the
cleanup. 96
The Nigerian government was much more demanding in the
diplomatic arena. When Nigeria discovered the wastes, it sig-
naled to Italy and the international community that it would not
tolerate the waste dump, and moved to the fore of the crusade
against the export of toxic wastes to developing countries. Ni-
geria requested the Italian government recall its charge d'affaires
in Lagos, recalled its own ambassador from Italy, appealed to
the International Court of Justice and appeared before the U.N.
General Assembly. Nigerian authorities also arrested the Italian
businessman Perazzi and fifteen Nigerians, threatening them
with execution. 97 In December 1988, Nigeria passed a decree
outlawing the purchase, sale, import, transport or storage of
toxic wastes, and made the penalty for any violations in this
regard life imprisonment, and stated that the director of any
corporate body and foreign officials involved in the trade will
be "subject to severe punishment," whether or not they have
diplomatic immunity. 98 Nigeria's claim of authority was signifi-
cant for international law, since it is asserting its prerogative to
punish offenders, whether they are nationals or not. Another
significant move on Nigeria's part came in August, when the
government gave full departmental status to the environment
planning and protection division of the Ministry of Works, an
indication of the seriousness and importance the country now
attached to the protection of the environment. 99
" GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 1, at 96.
17 Toxic Waste Importers Face Execution, supra note 58, at 1133.
" GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE, Mar. 1, 1989, at 3.
" Last Batch of Toxic Waste Removed, WEST AFRICA, Aug. 29-Sept.4, 1988, at
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL L.
While Italy assumed the costs because the managing firm
was Italian, the wastes in fact originated from several different
countries: Norway, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom
and the United States. Even the shipment of the wastes to Koko
was an international effort, since the five ships came from
several different countries. o
In September 1988, Italy responded to both Nigeria and the
other Western European countries who refused the waste, by
announcing a comprehensive plan to deal with the wastes. On
September 1, the Italian Minister of the Environment, Giorgio
Ruffolo, acknowledged Italy's responsibility, and the cabinet
approved a decree temporarily banning all shipments of wastes
to developing countries. On September 16, the Italian Parliament
proposed a weaker decree, that allowed the trade of wastes with
EEC and OECD countries, and with any other country as long
as that country agreed to the deal.' 0' Effective June 1989, the
decree became Europe's most prohibitive waste export law, ban-
ning exports of hazardous waste from Italy to any non-OECD
country. 02 As part of the first decree passed by the cabinet, each
region of Italy had to accept industrial waste for treatment.
Previous to the incident, Italy only had five waste disposal units
in the country, and had no industrial plan other than exporting
the wastes to other countries. Italy's response indicated that it,
as an exporter country, claimed responsibility for the final dis-
posal of the wastes, reaffirming the emerging international norm.
As Minister Ruffolo stated, "[d]isposing of wastes is the re-
sponsibility of those who have produced them. We cannot pass
off this responsibility to third countries and delays can only be
blamed on us." 0 3
In this respect, the Koko incident clarified the specific re-
sponsibilities of nations involved in cleanup. The exporting gov-
ernment, rather than producing ones, assumes most of the
financial and physical burdens of removing the contamination,
but does not recompense any individuals or the importing gov-
ernment for damages. The exporting government may seek to
recuperate the costs from the waste managers or carriers.
'o GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 1, at 95.
°' Jim Vallete, supra note 95, at 119.
101 No. 475.; GREEN EACE INVENTORY, supra note 1, at 331.
03 Toxic Waste Boomerang, supra note 34, at A4, col. 1.
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VII. INTERNATIONAL APPRAISAL
The international response to the Koko incident was uniform.
Countries, international governmental and nongovernmental
groups, and individuals all excoriated the dumping of wastes in
Nigeria. The response to the broader issue of the waste trade,
however, varied with time. Most developing countries called for
a total ban on the trade of toxic wastes, while industrialized
countries agreed to such a ban "in principle." World attention
focused increasingly on this issue since the late 1970s; still, it
wasn't until the Koko incident and the other incidents publicized
in 1988 that governments seriously worked toward achieving an
international consensus on the issue. By March 1989, the previ-
ous year's calls for action had culminated in the Basel Conven-
tion, where the previously established international norms of
prior notification and informed consent were most clearly reaf-
firmed. In December, 1989, for the first time, the European
Economic Community ("EC" or "EEC") agreed to ban all toxic
and nuclear waste exports to sixty-eight former European colo-
nies that form the African, Caribbean and Pacific ("ACP")
countries.' °4 With the EC's first commitment to ban exports to
developing countries, a new international norm banning the global
trade in wastes seems to be emerging.
The reaction of countries and governmental bodies initially
divided into two groups: those who favored more stringent re-
gulations such as prior notification by the exporting nation and
written consent from the importing one, and those who con-
demned the entire trade and who called for a ban on all toxic
waste exports. Most governments supported the aspirational norm
that it was the responsibility of the producer country to dispose
of their wastes properly without resorting to exporting them, but
it was not until the end of 1989 that exporting nations took
steps to significantly limit the international trade in toxic wastes.
In 1988, the main exporters, Europe and the United States,
advocated more stringent regulations rather than an outright ban
of the trade in hazardous wastes. Britain, for example, intro-
duced rules to increase safety procedures for importing danger-
ous chemical wastes, and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
" See Fourth ACPR-EEC convention, signed in Lom6, Dec. 15, 1989, reprinted
in 29 I.L.M. 809 (1990); Waste Shipments to 68 African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries
will be prohibited, GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE, Dec. 1989. at 2.
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introduced to Parliament legislation that would turn the 1986
EC directive (calling for a written agreement between the ex-
porter and importer) into law. 05 In an October 1988 meeting of
twelve EC environment ministers, toxic waste disposal was a
major concern, but only France and Netherlands called for
treatment of toxic wastes in the country of origin, rather than
allowing waste exports.'10 In November, the twelve environment
ministers adopted a resolution urging all industrialized countries
to reduce waste exports, and to warn developing countries about
the dangers of toxics.'t° In late May 1988, the European Parlia-
ment in Brussels unanimously passed a resolution calling for a
ban on large-scale exports of hazardous waste from Europe to
developing countries. 10
The United States considered several waste trade bills in
Congress-some of which called for a ban in trades and others
which would place new restrictions on waste exports. All of the
bills languished in committee and did not come up for a vote.1 9
At that point, the responses of the industrialized countries re-
affirmed the prevailing norm of requiring regulations for the
international trade, but did not wholeheartedly support the plan
emerging from the developing nations-that of a complete ban
on the export of dangerous wastes.
The demand for a global ban on the waste trade gathered
momentum in 1988, mainly from developing countries. Just
"I Europe's Failing Effort, supra note 19, 4, at 6.
,, New Developments in International Fora, GREENPEACE WAsTE TRADE UPDATE,
Jan. 15, 1989, at 3.
I ld.
' GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 1, at 303; for the document, see Official
Journal of the European Communities, No. C 158/239, June 26, 1989.
109 GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 1, at 287-88; Waste Export Control:
Hearing on H.R. 2525 Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Hazardous Mate-
rials, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1989); see H.R. 5018, 100 Cong., 2d Sess. (1988)(Waste
Export Prohibition Act of 1988, introduced by John Conyers (D-MI), banning all U.S.
exports of toxic waste, solid waste, incinerator ash, and oil wastes beyond North America
and imposing fines up to $50,000 for the first offense and up to $100,000 for 2d
offenses); S. 2598, 100 Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (Waste Export Control Act, sponsored
by Sen. Robert Kasten (R-WI), requiring disposal abroad of wastes be in accordance
with U.S. environmental standards, establishing a permit process); S. 2773, 100 Cong.,
2d Sess. (1988)(RCRA reauthorization bill, introduced by Sen. Max Baucus (D-MT),
which contained a provision that would allow waste exports to countries that agree to
establish "notice, export, and enforcement procedures and standards protective of human
health and the environment"); H.R. 5434, 100 Cong., 2d Sess. (1988)(introduced by
Rep. John Porter (R-IL), allowing waste exports if exporter could demonstrate that the
foreign waste operations could be conducted in accordance with U.S. environmental
standards).
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before the discovery of the wastes at Koko, the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) was already responding to the other inci-
dents. At a summit ending May 28, 1988, the OAU unanimously
passed a resolution condemning the transnational disposal of
nuclear and other hazardous wastes, and declared it a "crime
against Africans." 10 The OAU also called on waste dumpers to
clean up the areas already polluted."' On June 25, after the
Koko incident was made public, the Economic Community of
Western African States (ECOWAS) agreed to make it a criminal
offense to facilitate toxic waste dumping and agreed to set up a
regional "dump watch," at the urging of President Babangida."1
2
The "dump watch" would be a monitoring system where coun-
tries could pool and share information on the movements of
ships carrying hazardous wastes. At this conference, several strong
statements were made condemning the industrial exporters." 3
Other regional groups met and issued similar statements. At
the end of June, for example, sixty-six ACP states, in a joint
assembly with the EEC, condemned the international trade in
wastes and demanded "a ban in principle." 4 In July, twenty-
two members of the States of the Zone of Peace and Coopera-
tion of the South Atlantic met in Rio, again strongly condemning
the transfer of hazardous wastes."' By mid-July, the Organiza-
tion of Eastern Caribbean States had also agreed to ban foreign
waste dumping; and in August a convention in Cartagena urged
the same for its members." 6 In September, the foreign ministers
from 101 Non-Aligned Movement ("NAM") nations endorsed a
resolution calling for all NAM members to participate in moni-
toring and exchanging information on ships and companies par-
ticipating in hazardous waste trade. 1 7
Several developing countries remained silent about the whole
issue of hazardous wastes, apparently tempted by the much
needed foreign currency. In Angola, for example, President Jose
,,0 Organization of African Unity: Council of Ministers Resolution on Dumping of
Nuclear and Industrial Waste in Africa, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 567, 568 (1989) (prom-
ulgated on May 23, 1988) [hereinafter OAU Resolution].
Waste Dumping Furor, supra note 2, at 583.
112 ECOWAS says no to toxic waste, WEST AFRICA, July 4, 1988, at 1196.
113 Id.
' Jim Vallete, supra note 95, at 11.
It GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 1, at 64.
16 Id., at 122.
1" Non-Aligned Movement Condemns Waste Trade, GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE
UPDATE, July 15, 1989, at 4.
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Eduardo dos Santos entered into a preliminary agreement with
a major Swiss arms trader, Arnold Keunzler, in 1988, to bring
over five million tons of western industrial waste to Angola for
incineration and storage in exchange for $2 billion and the
construction of a new city, port and airfield which would provide
15,000 jobs."8 The Angolan government denied that the bill had
been signed, but Keunzler insisted that "the deal is clinched.""' 9
Even though Angola has been silent in the condemnation of the
practice, it was aware of the international norms against the
trade.
Guinea-Bissau reluctantly acceding to the international con-
sensus. In February 1988, it signed a five-year $600 million
contract to bury 15 million tons of toxic wastes from European
tanneries and pharmaceuticals in large holes."" The country would
have received a yearly payment of $120 million, an amount
nearly equal to its yearly gross national product of $150 million
and, when totalled, triple its foreign debt. Later Guinea-Bissau
did withdraw the plan, under pressure from its West African
neighbors, but said it was doing so "regretfully." The Tourism
and Trade Minister Manuel Maria Dos Santos acknowledged the
social costs of the transaction, but stated, "[w]e need the
money."'' In June 1988, President Joao Bernardo Vierira ap-
pealed to the international community for development aid,
"Send us what we can use to overcome under-development, not
what can kill us." 1
22
On March 22, 1989, thirty-five states and the European
Commission signed the UNEP Basel Convention, the first com-
prehensive effort to regulate the international trade in wastes, at
the close of the 116-nation convention. The Basel Convention,
instead of supporting a total ban of wastes, clearly reaffirmed
the norm of requiring exporting nations to give prior notification
and to receive written, informed consent from receiving nations. 23
Regional Updates on International Waste Trade Schemes, OREENPEACE WASTE
TRADE UPDATE, Jan. 15, 1989, at 5.
GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE, Mar. 1, 1989, at 4.
' GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 1, at 82.
The Global Poison Trade, supra note 1, at 66.
,u Paris AFP in English, Vieira Requests Aid After Canceled Toxin Deal, F.B.I.S.-
A.F.R., June 17, 1988, at 22.
- Basel Convention, Art. 4(l)(a),(c). Dr. Mostafa Tolba, executive director of the
UNEP, explained in an opening speech what he considered were the four major principles
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First, it defined hazardous wastes through two lists, one listing
hazardous chemicals and the other listing hazardous proper-
ties. 124 The convention excluded radioactive materials and house-
hold wastes, but emphasized that any state can define what
wastes it considers hazardous. 12 The convention also included
other obligations, which reflected the prevailing norms: states
must ensure minimum waste generation and availability of ade-
quate disposal facilities; 126 states may not export hazardous or
other wastes to parties which have prohibited the import of such
wastes; 2 7 the illegal traffic of wastes is criminal, 28 only author-
ized citizens may dispose of or transport wastes, which must be
clearly packaged and labelled according to international stan-
dards; 29 wastes must be disposed of in an environmentally sound
manner 30 and it is the responsibility of the exporting state; 3'
when a movement of wastes can't be completed, the exporter
has the duty to re-import the wastes; 32 states must cooperate in
developing new environmentally sound low-waste technologies,
in transferring technology and waste management systems and
in developing rules on liability and for compensation for damage
resulting from the movement of wastes.' 33 One important article
(which environmentalists denounce as a "loophole") specified
that bilateral, multilateral and regional agreements can be made
for which the convention does not apply, so long as the parties
ensure environmentally sound management of the wastes. 134 The
behind the convention:
1. It is the sovereign right of all countries to ban imports of hazardous
waste.
2. Hazardous wastes must be reduced. The chief short-term goal of the
Convention is minimum waste generation.
3. Hazardous wastes should be disposed of in the country of their origin.
Their transboundary movement should be reduced to a minimum, and
allowed only under very specific conditions.
4. Developing countries must have help to build the capacities for the most
effective waste management possible.
Diane Brady, New curbs on the commerce in poison, 1 OUR PLANET 18 1989.
I2 d., Art. I(1).
2 d., Art. 1(3); Art.3(a).
,26 Id., Art. 4(2)(a),(b),(c).
127 Id., Art. 4(l)(b).
1 Id., Art. 4(3).
129 d., Art. 4(7)(a),(b).
70 Id., Art. 4(8).
I' d., Art. 4(10).
3 Id., Art. 8
" Id., Art. 10 (1),(2); Art. 12.
,' Id., Art. 11.
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Convention would enter into force when a minimum of twenty
countries ratified it.
is5
The international responses to the convention varied, illus-
trating the conflicting claims. The nations which signed the
convention hailed its provisions as a significant first step towards
dealing with the global trade in wastes. Giorgio Ruffolo, Italy's
Minister of Environment stated, "[iut's the first serious inter-
national effort to regulate waste. We think it should allow us to
control this type of traffic. ' 13 6 Dr. Tolba emphasized, "[o]ur
agreement has not halted the commerce in poison, but is has
signaled the international resolve to eliminate the menace haz-
ardous wastes pose to the welfare of our shared environment
and to the health of the world's peoples." 1 7 Venezuela's state-
ment, for example, commented that "this Convention constitutes
a first important step in the direction sought by the developing
countries to ensure the protection of the environment and lay
down a general international legal framework to regulate trans-
boundary movements of hazardous wastes and minimize the
generation of hazardous wastes and ensure their environmentally
sound management." 3 8
The rest of the responses to the Basel Convention, predom-
inantly reservations, pointed to its rapidly eroding grasp of the
emerging international norms. Some signatory nations issued
reservations or called for more action. For example, Colombia,
Uruguay and Mexico urged the adoption of a protocol that
would establish appropriate procedures with regard to responsi-
bility and compensation for any damages that result from the
trade.' 39 Turkey called for a mechanism for effective control and
prevention of illegal traffic in hazardous wastes.'14 That these
measures were not included in the Basel Convention points to
the as yet incomplete nature of the emerging international con-
sensus.
African nations refrained as a bloc from signing the conven-
tion until the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had taken
a position. While Senegalese delegate Moctar Kebe said, "[wie
- Id., Art. 250).
11 U.N. Conference Supports, supra note 23, at BII, col.1.
Brady, supra note 123, at 20.
' Declaration of Venezuela, (Basel Convention materials).
,' Declaration of Colombia, (Basel Convention materials); declaration of Uruguay,
(Basel Convention Materials); declaration of Mexico,(Basel Convention materials).
-, Declaration of Turkey, (Basel Convention Materials).
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think it is a good Convention that has solved most of the
essential points," other African officials worried that industri-
alized nations would not do enough to apply the treaty, partly
because it gives receiving nations little in way of enforcement
mechanisms . 41 "We are unhappy because the treaty has been
watered down," Ahmed Mohammed Taylor-Kamara, Sierra
Leone's Minister of Environment, commented. 42 Previously, the
treaty had called for signatories to prohibit the shipment of
waste to countries that have less strict waste disposal policies,
but this provision was stricken mainly due to American and
West German pressure. Ghana also mentioned reservations on
the article that made importing states responsible for disposing
of the wastes if they are found to be responsible for illegal
trafficking of the wastes.
43
Environmental groups such as Greenpeace also found prob-
lems with the UN Basel Convention. Their concerns were that
the convention failed to define incinerator ash as a "hazardous"
substance, did not mention radioactive wastes, and allowed bi-
lateral and multilateral treaties that do not need to conform to
any of the provisions of the convention.'"
In March 1990, President Bush signed the Basel Conven-
tion. 45 On May 5, 1992, the Convention finally came into force,
when Australia became the 20th country to ratify the conven-
tion.'46 Mostafa Tolba, director of the U.N. Environment Pro-
gramme severely criticized 11 of the 12 EC member states, the
United States, Canada, and Japan for failing to ratify the Con-
vention.147 Soon afterwards, however, some of these countries
ratified the Convention or moved to do so.1
4
"' Brady, supra note 123, at 18.
", U.N. Conference Supports, supra note 23, at BI1, col. 3.
" Declaration of Ghana, (Basel Convention Materials).
" Greenpeace Analysis of the Basel Convention, GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UP-
DATE, July 15, 1989, at 3.
"4 Briefly, Los ANGELES TImEs, Mar. 22, 1990, at D2, col. 1.
I" Senate Committee Votes to Ratify Treaty, Implementing Legislation Still Needed,
BNA INT'L DAiLY, May 11, 1992 (available in LEXIS Nexus Library).
" Randall Palmer, U.N. Slams West for Not Ratifying Toxic Waste Pact, The
Reuter Library Report, Apr. 14, 1992 (available in LEXIS Nexus Library). The countries
that ratified the Convention are: Argentina, Australia, China, Czechoslovakia, El Sal-
vador, Finland, France, Hungary, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway,
Panama, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria and Uruguay. Id.
,41 Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic developed compromise legislation; see Com-
promise Reached on Ratifying Basel Treaty on Wastes, BNA INT'L EuvT DAIY, Apr.
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Even as countries lagged in ratifying the Basel Convention,
it rapidly seemed antiquated, as starkly contrasting efforts by
the European Parliament, the Organization of African Unity,
and others working for a global ban of all waste exports pushed
forward. In May 1988, the OAU passed a resolution declaring
the dumping of nuclear and industrial wastes in Africa to be a
crime against the African people. 49 In July 1989, the OAU
passed a resolution to begin drafting an African Convention that
would ban the import of all toxic wastes into the African con-
tinent. The convention that resulted, the Bamako Convention
on the Ban on the Import of All Forms of Hazardous Wastes
Into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Such Wastes Generated in Africa,' 50 expanded the definition of
hazardous wastes beyond that found in the Basel Convention,
and made the transport of wastes into Africa by non-party
nations an illegal and criminal act. 5' The Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) summit produced an endorsement of the Port of
Spain Accord, which, among other things, condemns the dump-
ing of hazardous wastes. In October, forty-eight leaders of Com-
monwealth nations issued the "Langwaki Declaration," accusing
wealthy nations of destroying the global environment, citing
among other things the "dumping" of wastes in developing
countries. 15 2 The September summit of the 102 nations of the
Non-Aligned movement also produced a resolution that called
for a global ban in the waste trade. 15 3 As of March 1991, 83
countries officially have closed their borders to waste imports
of all kinds. 54
28, 1992 (available in LEXIS, Nexus Library); the U.S. Senate ratified the Convention
August 11, 1992, see Treaty Document 102-5; Senate Ratifies Basel Convention, Treaty
to Protect Salmon Stocks, BNA INT'L ENVT DAILy, Aug. 18, 1992 (available in LEXIS,
Nexus Library); Canada ratified the Convention in September; see Basel Convention on
Shipment of Hazardous Wastes Ratified, BNA INT'L ENVT DAIY, Sept. 2, 1992 (available
in LEXIS, Nexus Library).
', OAU Resolution, supra note 110.
The Bamako Convention on the Ban on the Import of All Forms of Hazardous
Wastes Into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movements of Such Wastes
Generated in Africa, reprinted in 20 Eyrs. POL'Y & L. 173 (Sept./Oct. 1990) [hereinafter
Bamako Convention]. For a discussion of the Bamako Convention, see Louka, supra
note 9, at 10-11; Africa Adopts Sweeping Measures to Protect Continent from Toxic
Terrorism, GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE, Mar. 22, 1991, at 1.
"I Bamako Convention, Art. 4, para. 1; Art. 2.
15 Langwaki Declaration, INT'L HERALD Tam., Oct. 19, 1989.
"' GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE, supra note 82, at 2-3.
' Chile Becomes the 83d Country to Ban Waste Imports Outright, GREENPEACE
WASTE TRADE UPDATE, Mar. 22, 1991, at 7.
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Most significantly, European countries began moving to-
wards this goal as well. In June 1989, Italy placed into effect
Europe's most prohibitive waste export law, which prohibits the
export of municipal, special, toxic and hazardous wastes from
Italy to non-EC or OECD countries, as well as requires waste
exporters to pay a fee in order to export any wastes.' 55 The
French Ministry of the Environment announced its intent to ban
the waste trade nationally, and on September 19, 1989, Britain's
Secretary of the State for the Environment urged the EC gov-
ernments to restrict the export of toxic wastes. West German
Minister of the Environment, Klaus Toepfer stated a German
commitment to cease waste shipments to East Germany, the
country's first official statement to this effect. The London
Dumping Convention ("LDC"),15 6 which sets guidelines on ocean
dumping of wastes, considered a resolution to ban exports of
hazardous wastes from LDC to non-LDC countries at its 1990
annual summit.'57
In the summer of 1989, during the negotiations for the EEC/
ACP Lome IV Convention, a trade and aid pact between the
European Community and most of their former colonies, the
EEC agreed to ban all toxic and nuclear waste exports to sixty-
eight former European colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and
the Pacific. 58 This agreement, known as the Lome Convention,
became the most comprehensive ban on international waste trade,
and was the EEC's first commitment to ban waste exports to
any country. The Lome Convention only protects the sixty-eight
signatories and not the other less-industrialized countries in Latin
America, Asia, and the Middle East. "1
The latest expression of international norms in the area of
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes emerged in the
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de
Janeiro, in June 1992. For instance, one chapter of Agenda 21
dealt with the "[e]nvironmentally sound management of hazard-
ous wastes, including prevention of illegal international traffic
SS GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 1, at 331.
C' onvention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, London, Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165, 1046 U.N.T.S.
120, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 510 (1979).
" GREENPEACE INVENTORY, supra note 1, at 18.
" Fourth ACPR-EEC convention, signed in Lor6, Dec. 15, 1989, reprinted in 29
I.L.M. 809(1990); GREENFEACE INVENTORY, supra note 1, at 11.
15 Id.
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in hazardous wastes."'16 This chapter called for the prevention
of waste generation, the promotion of institutional capacities in
hazardous waste management, the international cooperation in
the mangement of transboundary wastes, and prevention of il-
legal international waste trade.16 1 The chapter also specifically
calls for the ratification of both the Basel Convention and the
Bamako Convention, the elaboration of a protocol on liability
and compensation, and the "[ellimination of the export of haz-
ardous wastes to countries that, individually or through inter-
national agreements, prohibits the import of such wastes, such
as, the contracting parties to the Bamako Convention, the fourth
Lom Convention or other relevant conventions, where such
prohibition is piovided for.'
1 62
An international consensus exists that generally denounces
the trade in wastes. Countries seem to agree that each govern-
ment should dispose of its own wastes, unless it lacks the tech-
nological capability to handle wastes. Regulations requiring
exporting states to issue prior notification of waste exports and
to obtain written consent from the importing states are the
predominant international expectations. Following Koko and
other incidents in late 1988 and early 1989, both waste exporters
and importers began to call for a ban on the trade, especially
between industrialized and developing countries. This emerging
norm of requiring a complete or partial ban of the trade was
even imbedded in the much disputed Basel Convention, in Article
15, Paragraph 7, which states that periodically the Conference
shall undertake .. .an evaluation of its [the Conference's]
effectiveness, and if deemed necessary, to consider the adop-
tion of a complete or partial ban of transboundary movements
of hazardous wastes and other wastes in light of the latest
scientific, environmental, technical and economic informa-
tion.
163
Certainly, if a country specifically prohibits the import of haz-
ardous wastes, either unilaterally or by international agreements,
the trade in wastes with that country is banned.
'1 Agenda 21, U.N. Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de
Janeiro, June 3-14, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/4 (Part II), ch. 20.
Id., at ch. 20.8.
"' Id., at ch. 20.7.
63 Basel Convention, Art. 15(7).
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VIII. IMPLICATIONS
In the Koko incident, the surprising lack of conflicting claims
and Italy's retrieval of the wastes following Nigerian and West-
ern European protests reinforce the prevailing norms against the
trade in toxic wastes between industrial and developing countries.
Nigeria exercised its right to ban the waste as well as to punish
the individuals involved, including a foreign businessman. The
Western European countries reiterated the "not in my backyard"
syndrome by denying the entry of the wastes. Italy, in retrieving
the wastes, accepted its responsibility as an exporter nation.
Numerous difficulties still exist before an international norm
truly representative of the world community can develop. One
issue is the conflict that arises when international environmental
concerns clash with a developing nation's historical right of
sovereignty (for instance, the right to accept a waste trade in
order to obtain much-needed money). The tension arises in the
context of the North-South debate, which has been a constant
issue in international environmental discourse-from the U.N.
Conference on the Human Environment, held at Stockholm in
1972 to the Conference on Environment and Development, held
in Rio in 1992.' 64 Key among the sources of tension is the vastly
different environmental priorities of the industrialized and de-
veloping countries due to their different stages of development.
Developed countries are primarily concerned with environmental
hazards of development, industrialism and consumerism: global
warming, acid rain, clean air, and depletion of ozone, while
developing countries are preoccupied by more basic environmen-
tal problems that stem from poverty and underdevelopment: safe
drinking water, erosion of land, and desertification.165 In the
- See generally Louis B. Sohn, The Stockholm Declaration on the Human Envi-
ronment, 14 HARv. INT'L L. J. 411 (1973); Kuala Lumpur Declaration on Environment
and Development, Second Ministerial Conference of Developing Countries on Environ-
ment and Development, April 1992; Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
A/CONF.151/5, May 7, 1992; Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment, TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION AND THE ROLE OF STATES, (OECD, 1981); Brief Sum-
mary of the General Debate, REPORT OF THE UN CONFERENCE ON T E Hum"
ENVIRONMENT, at 45-46.
" See Jan Pronk & Mahbubul Haq, The Hague Report, Hague Symposium, Nov.
25-27, 1991 (March 1992), at 10-11.
Unfortunately, the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes is truly a global
problem. Not only do developing countries suffer adverse environmental and health
consequences, but industrialized countries may also re-import goods manufactured from
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face of great poverty and financial pressures, developing coun-
tries claim it is their prerogative to choose their own priorities
when it comes to development, especially with regard to the use
of natural resources.
Principle 21 of the Declaration of the United Nations Con-
ference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972,
highlights the conflict:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause dam-
age to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction.'1
This statement of state sovereignty, coupled with the "respon-
sibility" clause, is repeated in identical language in the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, and has now
become Principle 2.167 As this statement shows, the most difficult
tasks in international environmental regulation and specifically
in the case of hazardous transfers is that, as the OECD reports,
"States ...will have to reconcile what are in some cases con-
flicting such as the right to exploit their natural resources and
their responsibility not to cause damage to the environment of
other states."1
68
Underlying the debate is perhaps the developing countries'
resentment of the implication that their development somehow
or based on those hazardous materials, closing a "circle of poison." See DAVID WEIR
& MARK SHAPIRO, CIRCLE OF POISON: PESTcmES AND PEOPLE IN A HUNGRY WORLD
(1981).
" United Nations Environment Programme, Declaration of the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment, REPORT OF THE UN CONFERENCE ON THE
HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, UN Document A/CONF.48/14 (1974), at 5.
" See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, United Nations Confer-
ence on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, June 3-14, 1992, Principle 2.
1 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, TRANSFRONT1ER
PoLtmON AND THE ROtE OF STATES, (OECD, 1981) at 6. But see Adeoye Akinsanya,
The UN Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: The International Protection
of the Economic Independence of Third World Countries-a New International Eco-
nomic Order, in THE FUTURE OF AFRICA AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER,
(Ralph 1. Onwuka & Olajide Aluko, eds., 1986), at 76 (stating that one of the basic
principles behind the New International Economic Order was the "full permanent
sovereignty of every State over its natural resources and all economic activities .... No
State may be subjected to economic, political or any type of coercion to prevent the
free and full exercises of this inalienable right").
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must be curtailed in the name of environmental protection, while
in their eyes, industrialized countries were able to exploit their
natural resources with impunity to achieve their present suc-
cesses. Although a growing consensus among leading thinkers
seems to be emerging that countries must embark on a new
concept of sustainable development-economic growth that pro-
vides fairness and opportunity for everyone without destroying
the earth's finite resources169 -developing countries still may try
to seek the unfettered growth that industrialized countries en-
joyed in the past.
The consequences of regulation of the waste trade versus the
consequences of a ban must also be weighed to more fully
appreciate the implications of the emerging international norms.
One of the negative aspects of regulation is simply the practical
difficulty of enforcing those regulations-waste trade deals occur
anyway, since obtaining the "informed consent" from a com-
petent authority is often as easy as a well placed bribe. Also, by
regulating the business, environmentalists charge that an "inter-
national stamp of approval" is conferred upon the trade. How-
ever, these reasons overlook the very important benefits of
regulation: keeping track of waste trades that do occur, ensuring
that the disposal of those wastes comply with international stan-
dards of environmentally sound practice and therefore reducing
possible harms, and perhaps most importantly, providing a means
by which world attention on this issue can be focused and in
which future expectations of authority and control may be shaped.
The problem with a global ban is also one of enforcement,
raising questions of monitoring, enforcement, liability, compen-
sation, and arbitration. A ban on the trade of wastes may even
lead to more environmental damage. Unscrupulous exporters
may decide to dump wastes in the ocean or incinerate them at
sea, a problem that already occurs with the current regulations.
Furthermore, a global ban on the waste trade could potentially
harm those countries which do not have the technological ca-
pability of disposing of the wastes properly. 70 On the positive
- See generally The Hague Report, supra note 166 (summarizing a symposium on
sustainable development, a model of economic development which focuses on people as
the primary concern, that incorporates environmentally safe technologies, and that
reflects the scarcity value of environmental resources into decision-making).
"I See also Michelle M. Vilcheck, Comment, The Controls on the Transfrontier
Movement of Hazardous Waste From Developed to Developing Nations: The Goal of a
"Level Playing Field," 11 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 643, 668-671 (1991) (discussing
arguments against a complete ban on transfrontier movement of hazardous wastes).
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side, a ban would force exporting and producing countries to
look toward alternative technologies for waste disposal that would
address the problem of waste generation in the first place.
Ultimately, the best policy for the environment and for sus-
tainable human development is to recognize that the production
of wastes is a continuum, and that regulation only focuses on
the "back end," or the disposal of the wastes, instead of on the
"front end," or the production of the wastes. Currently, waste
production is weakly controlled, poorly defined, and little sys-
tematic knowledge exists about it. ' In order to truly deal with
the problem of hazardous wastes, the entire production cycle of
goods must be revised. If the waste trade is internationally
banned, countries will be forced to think about the long-term
solutions that the earth and its people require. Minimizing waste
reduction would not be costless or easy, but the first step of
holding waste generators accountable and financially liable for
the safe disposal of their wastes is a good beginning.
The Koko incident brought to the world's attention, devel-
oping countries in Africa as well as the industrial Western Eur-
opean states, the international trade in hazardous wastes. The
main lesson, however, is a practical one: while an international
norm is emerging that condemns the waste trade and agrees on
the need for more stringent regulations or even a ban, the
individual waste traders and firms continue to face enormous
financial incentives to trade. Because the Basel Convention, like
most international agreements, has no enforcement mechanism,
waste trade schemes continue to flourish.172
An incident that illustrates the limited scope of the Basel
Convention or even the Lom6 Convention, occurred in October
17 Mary D. Uva & Jane Bloom, Exporting Pollution: The International Waste
Trade, ENVIRONMENT, June 1989, at 15-16.
"I The trade in wastes continues to proliferate around the world, as documented
continuously by Greenpeace. See generally GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE, Mar.
22, 1991, Summer 1991; GREENPEACE Toxic TRADE UPDATE 5.2 (1992). One illustration
of the scope of the toxic trade business can be seen in the shipping records of one ship,
the Ever Guest-from January 1991 to January 1992, the ship picked up the following
inventory of toxic cargo from New York ports: 747,600 lbs. of hazardous pesticides for
Taiwan and Korea; 2,249,000 lbs. of plastic waste for the Philippines, Indonesia, and
Hong Kong/China; 1,561,000 lbs. of plastic for Korea, Taiwan, India, Jamaica, Thai-
land, Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia; 3,933,000 lbs. of metal waste for
Hong Kong/China, Taiwan, Korea, Pakistan, India and Singapore; 114,513 lbs. of
asbestos for Indonesia and Malaysia; and 1,256,600 lbs. of hazardous cargo for six
countries. What Does a Waste Trading Vessel Really Carry? GREENPEACE Toxic TRADE
UPDATE 5.2 (1992) at 18.
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1989, when a Greek vessel, N.V. Arion I, sailed into Nigeria's
territorial waters on its way to Lom6, Togo, carrying 546 tons
of frozen meat contaminated by the 1986 Chernobyl accident.
7
The vessel was escorted out of Nigerian waters after being de-
tained for seventeen days. Another ship, the M. V. River Oli,
also attempted to land in Nigeria, carrying five containers of
radioactive beef, and was also turned away. 74 In response to the
radioactive meat incidents, the EC and the ACP countries drew
up a special clause in the Lom6 Convention, which would make
illegal the dumping of poisonous wastes in Africa by EC coun-
tries. The EC reaction to the meat ban called for by Senegal,
Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Togo, C6te d'Ivoire and Benin
has been muted; perhaps the EC countries are truly beginning
to respect statements such as that iterated by Ambassador Kane
of Senegal, "[w]e do not want products-waste, meat or milk-
powder-that have been refused entry elsewhere."'7
However, the latest incident illustrates that even while inter-
national norms have developed and countries around the world
condemn it, the practice of trade in wastes continues unabated-
even under the harshest circumstances. During the first week of
September 1992, the UNEP discovered that Somalia, devastated
by 20 months of famine and war, was to be the subject to twenty
years of hazardous waste imports, under a contract valued at
$80 million signed by the former minister of health of the acting
government, Nur Elmy Osman, and Italian and Swiss firms.
1 6
One of the warring faction's warlords, Ali Mahdi Mohamed,
who declared himself interim president after rebels overthrew
dictator Mohamed Siad Barre in January 1991, denied his offi-
cials had entered into the agreement, although unconfirmed re-
ports alleged otherwise.
17
The international responses to the Koko incident reaffirmed
norms developing since the late 1970s. Countries realize that
while individual firms are the actual participants in the trade,
' Radioactive meat wrangle, WEST AFRICA 1862 (Nov. 6-12, 1989).
GREENPEACE WASTE TRADE UPDATE, Dec. 1989, at 14.
,71 Radioactive meat wrangle, supra note 173, at 1862.
" Agence France Presse, Kenyan President Criticises Sending of Waste to Somalia,
Sept. 13, 1992 (available in LEXIS, Nexis Library); NPR, All Things Considered, Sept.
10, 1992 (available in LEXIS, Nexis Library).
" Toxic Dumping Plan? NEWSDAY, Sept. 11, 1992, at 14; Aidan Hartley, U.N. to
Probe Toxic Waste Dumping in Somalia, THE REUTER LIBRARY REPORT (available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library).
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the exporter state assumes responsibility for ensuring the proper
disposal of the wastes. Countries now have the right to ban
others' wastes. If waste trade is to occur, the exporter must
provide prior consent and receive written consent; and if the
wastes are exported but not properly disposed, the exporting
country is responsible for retrieving these wastes. The interna-
tional norm banning the transboundary movement of wastes is
in its infant stages, but it is definitely emerging. Developing
countries clearly call for an international ban on the export of
wastes, and have indeed banned the wastes on regional levels.
The Lom convention that bans trade of wastes between EC and
ACP countries is a positive sign that the international community
is prepared to seriously consider a collective effort to control
the international trade in wastes. The optimal solution of mini-
mizing waste production is still beyond the horizon of prevailing
international expectations, but perhaps in the next decade of
increasingly environmentally conscious governments and people,
first steps toward this goal may also ensue.
